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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V 
V . 
JOHNNIE BASKINS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20090810 
INTRODUCTION 
Johnnie Baskins, by and through his attorney of record contends that this Court 
does have jurisdiction to address this appeal because he did not unambiguously withdraw 
his motion to withdraw the plea. The trial court, he contends, did not clearly and 
unambiguously establish Mr. Baskins' intent on the record. Additionally, he claims that 
his silence, when the court withdrew the motion, cannot count as valid relinquishment of 
his constitutional right to jury trial. Finally, the trial court failed to make adequate 
findings upon which to make a determination on this issue on appellate review. 
ARGUMENT 
L THIS COURT DOES HAVE JURISDICTION TO ADDRESS THIS APPEAL 
BECAUSE MR, BASKINS DID NOT UNAMBIGUOSLY WITHDRAW HIS 
MOTION TO WITHDRAW AND THE COURT FAILED TO MAKE ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS UPON WHICH TO BASE THIS CONCLUSION. 
According to the state, Mr. Baskins "unambiguously withdrew his motion, thereby 
depriving this Court of jurisdiction." Aplee's Br. at 16. Specifically, the state argues that 
Mr. Baskins' silence when the court proceeded with sentencing constituted "approval of 
the court's acceptance of his withdrawl of the motion." Aplee's Br. at 19. This contention 
is erroneous for two reasons. First, the record reflects that Mr. Baskins did not 
unambiguously withdraw his motion. Second, Mr. Baskins' silence cannot be construed 
as a valid waiver of a constitutional right. 
A. Mr. Baskins Did Not Unambiguously Withdraw His Motion 
First, the record does not demonstrate that Mr. Baskins affirmatively and 
unambiguously withdrew his motion. His counsel stated to the court that Mr. Baskins 
wished to withdraw his motion. The court then asked, 
The Court: Mr. Baskins, is that what you want to do? I guess you had filled it out 
yourself or filed it on your own without your attorney? 
Mr. Baskins: Yes. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Allen: We've - we do want to talk a little bit about some of the facts of the 
case. 
The Court: Okay. 
Mr. Allen: But I understand the victim is here. Maybe it would be helpful to have 
them go first. 
The Court: All rights. So we'll go ahead and withdraw the motion. You say you 
want to have the State heard first on this or do you want -
Mr. Allen: I think the victim is here ... 
(R. 98:2-3.) Mr. Baskins did not speak again until nearly ten pages later in the transcript, 
and it was to contest the facts surrounding the case. Id. at 13-14. Yet, the court's question 
was actually a three-part question. First, it asked whether Mr. Baskins wanted to 
withdraw his motion. Second, it asked whether Mr. Baskins had filled out the motion 
himself. Third, it asked whether he filed the motion himself without his attorney's advice. 
Mr. Baskins' answer was a simple, "Yes," and the record does not demonstrate which 
question he was answering. This answer cannot be sufficient to demonstrate that Mr. 
Baskins was knowingly and intelligently withdrawing his motion. As the defendant's 
motion indicated, he was dissatisfied with counsel and with the plea agreement—the 
court in this situation had an obligation to clarify with Mr. Baskins his specific intentions. 
A "yes" to a compound question cannot be taken as an "unambiguous" waiver. In 
one case, this Court reversed a conviction because the judge, at voir dire, asked a single 
compound question to three jurors, which single question failed to "rebut an inference of 
bias" among the jurors. State v. Woolley. 810 P.2d 440,441 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 
826 P,2d 651 (Utah 1991). The Court was troubled that the jurors were not "questioned 
individually and each allowed to respond verbally." Id at 448. If this Court has been 
troubled at the use of a compound question to probe jurors about bias, then it certainly 
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should be troubled about the use of a compound question as an adequate basis for 
withdrawl of a motion in which one reclaims his right to jury trial. In fact, this Court 
reversed the conviction for this failure in the Wooley case. 
B. Mr, Baskins Did Not Unambiguously Withdraw His Motion by Silence 
The state asserts that because Mr. Baskins remained silent, he accepted the court's 
withdrawl of the motion. Aplee's Br. at 17-23. This argument ultimately misstates the 
standard for relinquishment of constitutional rights. 
As the United States Supreme Court has articulated, albeit in the context of the 
waiver of the right to counsel: 
[CJourts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental 
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of 
fundamental rights. A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or 
abandonment of a known right or privilege. The determination of whether there 
has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend, in each case, 
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused. 
Johnson v.Zerbst. 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938) (emphasis added). 
As Justice Harlan articulated in his concurring opinion in Dickey v. Florida, 398 
U.S. 30 (1970): 
[TJhe equation of silence or inaction with waiver is a fiction that has been 
categorically rejected by this Court when other fundamental rights are at stake. 
Over 30 years ago in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,464 (1938), we defined 
"waiver" as "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or 
privilege." We have made clear that courts should "indulge every reasonable 
presumption against waiver," Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 
(1937), and that they should "not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental 
rights." Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 307 (1937) 
Id. at 39. As the Supreme Court pointed out in reference to Miranda and a waiver of the 
right to silence, 
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of 
the right to counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not 
inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not 
one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact knowingly and voluntarily 
waived the rights delineated in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in 
Miranda, mere silence is not enough. 
North Carolina v.Butler. 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (emphasis added). 
In Utah, the Supreme Court has said that the "general principle in our case law" is 
that "mere silence is ordinarily not a waiver, unless there is some duty or obligation to 
speak." Soter's v. Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan. 857 P.2d 935,940 (Utah 1993). 
The Utah Supreme Court had to determine whether a defendant, by his silence, 
had waived his right to closure of a public trial. State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153, 155-56 
(Utah 1989). The court determined that in that case, his silence could constitute a waiver. 
But that was because, in the court's opinion, "the right to a public trial" is "of a different 
order" than other fundamental rights which would require express waivers. 
It is helpful to compare other rights that have been held to require a personal 
waiver by the defendant. Among these are the right to trial, which is waived by a 
plea, see Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242,23 L. Ed. 2d 274,89 S. Ct. 1709 
(1969); the right to be present at trial, see United States v. Gordon, 264 U.S. App. 
D.C. 334,829 F.2d 119,123 (D.C. Cir. 1987); the right to trial by jury, see Patton 
v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,312,74 L. Ed. 854,50 S. Ct. 253 (1930); and the 
right to an interpreter at trial, see People v. Mata Aguilar, 35 Cal. 3d 785,794-95, 
677 P.2d 1198,1204,200 Cal. Rptr. 908,914-15 (1984). A unifying characteristic 
of these rights appears to be that they are of central importance to the quality of 
the guilt-determining process and the defendant's ability to participate in that 
process. See, Tigar, Foreward: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the 
Citadel, 84 Harv. L. Rev 1,18 (1970) (appropriate focus is on an "assessment of 
the significance of a procedural right to the proper defense of an accused"). 
We judge the right to a public trial to be of a different order. 
14 at 115-56. 
The court opined that the plea process and a defendant's waiver of his right to trial 
constitute fundamental constitutional rights, which require a defendant to make a 
personal waiver. See also. State v. Morrey, 64 P. 764,765 (Utah 1901) ("His mere 
silence or failure, during the trial, to object to the jurisdiction assumed by the court, did 
not constitute a waiver of that right.") As the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals said 
regarding the court's duty on a defendant's waiver of his right to appeal: 
An appeal waiver is not knowingly or voluntarily made if the district court fails to 
specifically question the defendant concerning the waiver provision . . . during the 
[Fed. R. Crim. P.] 11 colloquy and the record indicates that the defendant did not 
otherwise understand the full significance of the waiver. 
United States v.Johnson, 410 F.3d 137,151 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). 
This case really has to do with whether Mr. Baskins validly waived his right to a 
jury by pleading guilty. Mr. Baskins asked the court to allow him to withdraw his plea 
and then at the next hearing, his counsel indicated that Mr. Baskins was withdrawing this 
motion. In essence, Mr. Baskins was again waiving his right to a jury. The trial court had 
an affirmative obligation to verify with Mr. Baskins that it was his intention to again 
waive his right to go to trial and it would be under the same obligations at it would 
normally be in a Rule 11 colloquy: it must verify specifically with the defendant whether 
he is affirmatively waiving his rights. 
The burden of compliance with rule 11 rests squarely upon the trial court, which 
"means that the trial court [must] personally establish that the defendant's guilty 
plea is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the record that the defendant 
knowingly waived his . . . constitutional rights." State v. Visser, 2000 UT 88, P 11, 
22P.3dl242. 
State v. Alexander. 2009 UT App 188,J 6,214 P.3d 889. This requirement should be no 
less in this case. The court had an obligation to establish, like the earlier plea before it, 
that the defendant voluntarily waived this right. 
In Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,299 (1930), the Supreme Court dealt with 
the question as to whether the Constitution prohibited the defendants from waiving their 
right to a 12 person jury. All defendants had waived the right on the record, individually 
and with the advice of counsel. IdL at 286-87. The court held that they could validly 
waive their right to a jury, but certain safeguards had to be guaranteed: 
Not only must the right of the accused to a trial by a constitutional jury be 
jealously preserved, but the maintenance of the jury as a fact finding body in 
criminal cases is of such importance and has such a place in our traditions, that, 
before any waiver can become effective, the consent of government counsel and 
the sanction of the court must be had, in addition to the express and intelligent 
consent of the defendant. And the duty of the trial court in that regard is not to be 
discharged as a mere matter of rote, but with sound and advised discretion, with an 
eye to avoid unreasonable or undue departures from that mode of trial or from any 
of the essential elements thereof, and with a caution increasing in degree as the 
offenses dealt with increase in gravity. 
I$L at 312-13. 
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The rule of law is clear: before a court can allow a defendant to waive a 
fundamental right, it has an obligation to question the defendant and obtain his express 
and intelligent consent—he must unequivocally state that he waives the issues. This 
cannot be performed perfunctorily, as was done by the court in this case. 
C. The Trial Court Had an Affirmative Obligation to Make Factual Findings 
According to Rule 12(e) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, "Where factual 
issues are involved in determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the 
record." 
In State v. Humphrey. 2003 UT App. 333,79 P.3d 960 the defendant entered a 
guilty plea. Prior to sentencing, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw the plea, which 
was denied by the court. The defendant, this Court said, can meet his burden on 
withdrawing the guilty plea by presenting some evidence that the plea was involuntary. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(a). 
Once such evidence is presented to the court, the court needs to assess the 
credibility of the evidence and make detailed findings on all relevant facts. See 
Id. Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to 
state its findings on the record "where factual issues are involved in determining a 
motion." Furthermore, the trial court's findings must be sufficiently detailed to 
allow the appellate court the opportunity to adequately review the trial court's 
decision. See State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880,882 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
State v. Humphrey. 2003 UT App. 333, J 10,79 P.3d 960 (emphasis added). In 
Humphrey, this Court remanded the matter for the trial court to make necessary factual 
findings regarding the motion to withdraw. Id 
This error was fundamental, namely because this Court has an inadequate basis to 
review whether Mr. Baskins validly withdrew his motion. If the court had personally 
inquired the matter in more detail with the defendant and entered findings of fact, it 
would enable this Court to engage in adequate appellate review. But in the absence of 
actual findings, this Court is left to speculate and conjecture the defendant's intent by his 
silence and by the statements of his attorney. This cannot be a valid basis to determine a 
waiver of a fundamental right, like the right to a jury trial. 
The state relies on two cases in support of its argument, both of which are 
inapplicable to the case at hand. First, it relies on State v. Carapia. 2009 UT App 71. In 
that case, the defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In that case, the 
defendant withdrew the motion and it "was not addressed prior to sentencing" so this 
Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The first major difference here is that the Mr. 
Baskins did not unambiguously withdraw his motion. In Carapia. there was no dispute 
about whether the defendant had actually withdrawn his motion—in fact the defendant 
moved to dispose of his case so he could pursue a post-conviction remedy. Id. In essence, 
he stipulated that the motion had been withdrawn. Secondly, in Carapia, the motion was 
not addressed at sentencing. In this case, the matter was addressed by the court at 
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sentencing. This difference is also fundamental because Carapia's case was dismissed 
because of the absence of litigation on this issue. Mr. Baskins' case is different because 
the trial court addressed his motion at sentencing. 
The state also relies on State v. Corwell. 2005 UT 28, 114 P.3d 549 for the 
proposition that a defendant's silence constitutes waiver of a constitutional right. Aplee's 
Br. at 19. This is an inaccurate statement of the holding of Corwell. In this case, the 
defendant, during the plea colloquy answered two of the court's questions in the 
affirmative. Subsequently, the court asked her if she understood the importance of the 
rights she was giving up. Apparently, Ms. Corwell's answer was inaudible. Despite the 
inaudibility, this Court said that "the fact that the district court continued the plea 
colloquy without interruption suggests that Corwell responded in the affirmative." State 
v, Corwell. 2005 UT 28, J 5, 114 P.3d 549. Yet this is not even the holding of Corwell. 
Corwell holds that the district court did not err when it informed Ms. Corwell of her right 
to a speedy trial and when it incorporated the plea affidavit. Id. 5 22. In fact, at no point 
was it alleged that Ms. Corwell said anything other than "Yes" in the inaudible portion of 
the transcript. This Court never held, or even opined, that her silence meant acquiescence. 
There was no allegation that she was even silent. It merely stated, in passing, that given a 
gap in the recording and the subsequent conversation, it appeared the defendant had 
audibly answered the court's question in the affirmative. This is far from the proposition 
that a defendant's silence can be equated to a waiver of his constitutional rights. 
Finally, the state alleges that Mr. Baskins' conduct is more akin to an Alford plea 
"in all but name". Aplee's Br. at 21. The state argues that his conduct was consistent with 
one entering a plea, but still disputing the facts of the case. Id. This approach is entirely 
speculative and neglects the vast majority of actual information on the record. First, the 
defendant affirmatively stated in his motion to withdraw that his attorney-client 
relationship had deteriorated and that he was "misled into believing the true nature of the 
plea deal." (R. 32-35.) Second, the court's single question failed to clarify that counsel's 
representations adequately represented defendant's state of mind. Given Mr. Baskins' 
previously-stated difficulties with counsel, the court had an independent obligation to 
ensure Mr. Baskins was truly wishing to withdraw his motion. Finally, at no point during 
the sentencing proceeding did Mr. Baskins affirmatively state that he was withdrawing 
his motion. In fact, the only thing he consistently did was maintain his innocence. The 
state, on the other hand, must speculate that by Mr. Baskins' silence, and by his previous 
ability to jump in and stop things when he did not agree, that it somehow meant that his 
silence constituted a waiver in this case. This is not the constitutional standard for a valid 
waiver—there must be a dialogue between the court and the defendant to ensure the 
decision is being voluntarily entered. This could have been satisfied in this case by one 
additional question: "Just to clarify, Mr. Baskins, is it your intention to withdraw the 
motion you've filed?" Even better, the trial court could have asked two or three more 
questions: "You've indicated in here that you are dissatisfied with your attorney. Is he 
accurately stating that you wish to withdraw the motion?" "Are you now satisfied that 
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this plea deal is in your best interests?" Questions like this would have easily resolved the 
problem. 
Ironically, Alford, as cited by the state, supports Mr. Baskins' argument that a 
more thorough colloquy needed to take place. In order to enter an Alford plea, the court 
must conduct an even more thorough colloquy: 
By entering an Alford plea, a defendant does not admit guilt. Rather, the defendant 
enters a guilty plea because he recognizes that a prosecutor has enough evidence 
to obtain a guilty verdict. In North Carolina v. Alford, Mr. Alford argued that he 
was innocent of the murder charge but pled guilty to second degree murder in an 
attempt to avoid the threat of a sentence of death for first degree murder. 400 U.S. 
25,28,91 S. Ct. 160,27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970). The United States Supreme Court 
stated that "while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an 
express admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the 
imposition of criminal penalty." Id. at 37. The Court went on to hold that "[a]n 
individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly 
consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to 
admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime." Id. The Court concluded 
that this type of plea would be appropriate when "a defendant intelligently 
concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the 
judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt." Id. 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1,5 9 n. 2,647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (emphasis added). 
If a trial court plans to take an Alford plea, it has an obligation to ensure, on the 
record, that the defendant is knowingly and intelligently choosing this course of action: 
While typically guilty pleas "consist of both a waiver of trial and an express 
admission of guilt," Alford pleas are ones in which a defendant "voluntarily, 
knowingly, and understandingly consents to the imposition of a prison sentence 
even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting 
the crime." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25,37,27 L. Ed. 2d 162,91 S. Ct. 
160,167 (1970). The Alford court held that "an express admission of guilt . . . is 
not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty." Id. at 37-38, 
91 S. Ct. at 167. The Court upheld defendant's guilty plea after reviewing the plea 
"in light of the evidence against [the defendant) which substantially negated his 
claim of innocence and which further provided a means by which the judge could 
test whether the plea was being intelligently entered" Id. at 38,91 S. Ct. at 167. 
The Alford court further stated: 
Because of the importance of protecting the innocent and of insuring that 
guilty pleas are a product of free and intelligent choice, various state and 
federal court decisions properly caution that pleas coupled with claims of 
innocence should not be accepted unless there is a factual basis for the plea, 
(citations omitted) and until the judge taking the plea has inquired into and 
sought to resolve the conflict between the waiver of trial and the claim of 
innocence. 
Id. at 38 n.10,91 S. Ct. at 167-68 n.10. 
State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666,672 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (emphasis added). Alford pleas 
are a particular anomaly. A defendant will submit to a sentence, but will not accept guilt. 
Because of this odd disparity, the courts have held that judges have an affirmative 
obligation in such cases to diligently inquire into the disparity and try to resolve the 
conflict as to why the defendant is entering a plea. 
If the state is contending that Mr. Baskins' conduct was more representative of an 
Alford plea, then this only further underscores the fact that the trial court had an 
affirmative obligation to resolve why there appeared to be a conflict in Mr. Baskins' 
behavior. He pled guilty but still maintained his innocence; he had filed a motion 
asserting his innocence. At a minimum, the trial court had an obligation to try to 
reconcile with the defendant, on the record, how he had resolved these conflicts. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on Mr. Baskins opening brief, he asks this Court to find that he did not enter 
a knowing and voluntary plea. But if the Court is inclined to address the jurisdictional 
issue, he asks the Court to remand this matter to the trial court in order to make findings 
as to whether Mr. Baskins validly and expressly waived his right to a trial by 
withdrawing his motion and ultimately whether Mr. Baskins plea should be validly 
withdrawn. 
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